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The Forces in Law: Sanctions and 
Coercions 
 
JORGE  EMILIO NUNEZt 
 
 
I.     Concepts  and Conceptions 
 
Two concepts that remain solidly as objects of debate amongst scholars specialised 
in legal theory,  legal  philosophy,  and jurisprudence  are  sanction  and  coercion.  I 
argue that the extension for so long now of this particular hermeneutical  debate has 
to do mainly with two ways of interpreting  what seems to be the same objects of 
study, that is the concepts of sanction and coercion. Therein, what in principle may 
seem  to  be  disagreement  about  the  concepts,  I  argue,  is  a  disagreement  about 
different  conceptions  of these  concepts.  Ergo, the debate is really one between  a 
certain  strand  of  post-Hartian   legal  theory  on  the  one  side  and  several  other 
approaches, pragmatists and Kelsenians, on the other. The Hartian tradition 
misunderstands  the role of coercion in law and a closer look at Kelsen can help us 
understand in what ways Hartian orthodoxy on the matter falls short. 
 
The substantive argument of the paper concerns whether law is essentially 
coercive, and if so, in what sense. A previous article considered the two claims 
introduced  by  Schauer. 1  This  paper  will  revise  some  of the  previous  arguments, 
taking  cognisance  of Yankah's  views, and considering,  in particular,  and in more 
detail, the reason coercion is generally part of the concept of law (and of its nature), 
and,  occasionally  absent  from  such  concept  (and  its  nature).  In  advancing  our 
analysis, it is important to distinguish what legal philosophers mean when they refer 
to coercion as a condition for a legal system, that is, whether coercion is necessary, 
sufficient, or contingent (maybe desirable) in order to define law. In doing so, it is 
also of pivotal importance  to distinguish  whether  legal philosophers,  in discussing 
the terms  necessity,  sufficiency  and contingency/desirability, are using such terms 
in  the  conceptual  or  natural  sense  or,  indeed,  in  both  senses.  It is  intended  to 
introduce familiar yet controversial  examples that have been used to illuminate not 
 
 
 
A very early version of this paper was published as J E NU:fiez,  'HopMaTIIBHhie 
CIICTeMhi KaK rrpaBo  B CIIHepriiii:   )J,EHCTBIITEJibHOCTb 11 )J,EHCTBEHHOCTb' 
(in English, 'Nonnative Systems as Law in Synergy: Validity and Effectiveness') in 
Philosophy  of  Law  and  State  Responsibility   (2012). For a  subsequent, more 
elaborated version, see Jorge Emilio Nufiez, 'The Force of Law: Law and Coercion, 
Validity and Effectiveness, and  Synergy' in  Christoph Bezemek and  Nicoletta 
Ladavac (eds), The Force of Law Reaffirmed:  Frederick  Schauer Meets  the Critics 
(2016) 107. My gratitude to the anonymous referees for their comments, arguments, 
objections and suggestions. The original has benefitted enormously from these 
thoughtful and thought-provoking points. 
See Nufiez, 'The Force ofLaw', above n t. 
  
 
only the concept  of law (and its nature)  but also - particularly  -the theory  of 
coerciOn. 
 
II.    Coercion Is Generally or by Default Part of the Law 
 
Coercion  is generally part of the law - ie part of the law by  default. In order to 
assess hermeneutical  different understandings,  attention will be centred on coercion 
as:  a) a sanction  - ie a broad  interpretation  of  coercion  or coercion  arising  by 
default;  and b) a view  sensu  stricto  - ie a narrow  account  of coercion.2   In this 
regard, this section will characterise  and differentiate  sanction and coercion.  In the 
next section, different modes of coercion will be assessed.  The problem arises, it is 
argued, from a different understanding  of the meaning of the term  sanction. Thus, 
coercion  is usually discarded,  at least by the Hartian tradition,  because it is inter- 
defined with terms such as force or threat. 
 
Once upon a time, there were many theories in legal philosophy, legal theory, 
or jurisprudence that included coercion when defining and describing the nature and 
characteristics  of law-eg Bentham's, Austin's, Kelsen's,  to name a few classical 
examples.  They  all maintain - at least broadly - that law needs some form  of 
coercion;  such  a  view  is,  indeed,  intuitively  plausible.  An  obvious  example  is 
criminal  law.  Although  Hart does  not include  the notion  of coercion  directly,  he 
concedes that rules circumscribe  behaviours and therefore individuals are not free to 
do what they want.3 
 
But dissent came. Currently, it is a truism in legal philosophy that law cannot 
be defined  as commands  backed  by force.  Indeed,  Bentham,  Austin,  Kelsen, and 
many others  before them were intellectually  blind to the reality that law included 
other norms too (eg power conferring  norms); the views  of such authors  were so 
utterly  misconceived  that  Hart  had  to  enlighten  us all.  Therein,  it is arguably  a 
dogmatic view in post-Hartian  legal philosophy that coercion is not integral to the 
nature and characteristics of law. 
 
To the surprise of many, Schauer's The  Force  of Law  reopens the question 
long  ago  considered  to  be  settled.  In  his  book  Schauer  makes  two  interlinked 
claims:   a)  it  is  necessary   to  challenge   the  current  way  in  which   we   study 
jurisprudence;   and  b)  the  law  is  commonly   and  valuably  coercive. 4   However, 
 
 
 
 
Ibid. Nufiez, 'The Force of Law', above n t, uses the expressions thick and thin when 
referring to different accounts of coercion. For the sake of simplicity, and to avoid 
confusion with the use of the vocabulary in different languages mainly due to literal 
translations that may not reflect what I mean to say, I will refrain from using these 
terms. Specifically, the thin/thick distinction about coercion may be  somewhat 
confusing, given that calling thin the use of force may be counterintuitive for the 
English language. 
H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed, 1997) 87. 
Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law (2015). 
  
 
surprisingly,  Schauer  is not alone  in adopting  such a view.  Taking  the argument 
even further, Yankah tells us that law is inherently coercive.5 
 
Schauer claims that legal philosophy currently limits its inquiry to essential 
features ofthe concept and nature oflaw6 and disputes the settled approach. Yankah 
also argues that currently, for legal philosophers,  coercion  is deemed peripheral to 
law.7  In tune with this, legal philosophers -their thinking conditioned  by H L A 
Hart's  The Concept  of Law -postulate that law cannot be identified with force - 
ie coercion is not a necessary precondition for law to be.8 
 
Schauer concurs that 'noncoercive law both can and does exist'.9  This is not, 
however,  an issue he addresses  in The  Force  of  Law.  But, because contemporary 
legal  philosophy  is  predicated  on  the  notion  that  coercion  is  not  a  necessary 
precondition   for  law  - and  legal  philosophy  seems  to  be  interested  only  in 
expounding  the essential  features  of law   - 'coercion  loses  its philosophical  or 
theoretical interest in explaining the nature oflaw'. 10 
 
Yankah  advances  a  more  extreme  view.  According  to  him,  Hart  and  his 
followers could not see that coercion was a distinguishing  element between law and 
threats, causing such jurists to discard previous models. 11 Arguably, from a Hartian 
perspective,  coercion  was  a  mere  natural  necessity  not  entailing  the  conceptual 
necessity  of taking  cognisance  of coercion  in defining the law. 12  Yankah  dissents. 
Coercion,  in his view, is not only important,  but, also necessary- both naturally 
and conceptually-in defining legal norms. 13 
 
In order to disentangle these apparent differences we need to consider what 
questions we ask and what assumptions we raise when we characterise the law and 
when  we  discuss  whether  coercion  is a  precondition  for  law.  More  specifically, 
what  assumptions  the  Hartian  tradition  has  and  whether  these  assumptions  fall 
short. These questions are: What is law? Is coercion necessary for law? Is coercion 
a natural  necessity  for law?  Is coercion  a conceptual  necessity  for  law? What  is 
coercion? 
 
 
Ekow N Yankah, 'The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms' (2008) 
42 University of Richmond Law Review 1195. 
Schauer, The Force of Law, above n 4, 4. 
Yankah, above n 5, 1197. 
It is appropriate to make clear that this view - ie coercion is not central, not 
necessary for law - has been maintained and questioned in  legal philosophy. 
However, it must be noted that outside legal philosophy, coercion is still seen as a 
necessary condition for law. See Sandra Raponi, 'Is Coercion Necessary for Law? 
The Role of Coercion in International and Domestic Law' (2015)  8  Washington 
University   Jurisprudence  Review  35,  37,  especially 37  n 7  and the reference to 
political philosophy. 
Schauer, The Force of Law, above n 4, 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Yankah, above n 5, 1195. 
12  Ibid 3. Hart, above n 3, 193-200. 
13 Yankah, above n 5, 1197. 
  
 
Although the above questions are interlinked, they do not necessarily  refer to 
the same phenomena.  Thus, when they do, such questions do not refer to the same 
phenomena in the same manner. Let us be more precise. Firstly, when we ask what 
the  law  is it will be assumed  in this paper, for the sake of simplicity,  that we are 
referring  to  necessary  or  essential  elements  only. 14  Indeed,  as  Schauer  notes,  in 
order  to  define  and  characterise  the  law,  reference  may  be  had  to  sufficient, 
contingent  or desirable  conditions.  However,  Schauer's claim against legal 
philosophers   with  regard  to  their  enquiry   is  both  unfair  and  incorrect.  Legal 
philosophers do refer to and undertake thorough analysis of non-essential  elements 
that  characterise  the  law.  Green,  in  his  analysis,  makes  this  very  point. 15   This 
particular apparent disagreement will be deferred to the future for more detailed 
discussion. 16 
 
Secondly,  the  paper  will  discuss  whether  coercion  has  a  relationship  of 
conceptual  necessity  with what  the law  is. Even Hart accepted  that coercion has a 
natural  central  role in  law. 17  The  question  as to  whether  coercion  is a naturally 
necessary condition of the law is irrelevant here. In this regard, both sides of the 
jurisprudential  debate or both legal philosophical  traditions  seem to agree  on this 
point. 
 
Having  clarified  that  the  paper  will  discuss  only  whether  coercion  is  a 
conceptually necessary condition of what the law is, a further question remains 
unanswered,  namely,  what  is  coercion?   Having  regard  to  the  different  answers 
given  by legal  theorists,  it is suggested  that the  key  to  deciding  whether  or  not 
coercion  is  a  necessary   conceptual   condition   of  law  is  to  recognise  that  the 
differences  are  attributable  more  to  the  different  ways  of  understanding   what 
coercion means rather than to actual differences  with regard to whether coercion is 
conceptually  necessary  or not. In other words, some may maintain that coercion is 
conceptually necessary to define what the law is (classically, but not only, Austin, 
Bentham,  Kelsen's  view);  some  may  maintain  that  coercion  is not  conceptually 
necessary to define what  the law is (Hart and his followers). 18 It is argued that both 
sides of the jurisprudential  divide disagree on the answer, not because of differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 The author uses the terms essential  and necessary  interchangeably here. Following 
Alexy '[e]ssential or necessary properties of law are those properties without which 
law would not be law': Robert Alexy, 'On the Concept and the Nature of Law' 
(2008) 21 Ratio Juris 281. 
15 Leslie Green, 'The Forces of Law: Duty, Coercion, and Power' (2016) 29 Ratio Juris 
164. 
16 The author has previously ventured the discussion: Nufiez, 'The Force of Law', 
above n t. 
17 Hart, above n 3, 198; Green, above n 15, 165. 
18 For a list of authors that argue coercion is not necessary, see Schauer, The Force of 
Law, above n 4, 2, 171 n 3. 
  
 
on the perceived conceptual necessities pertaining to what the law is, but because of 
their different views about the term coercion.19 
 
In order to make clear what coercion means, we have to be precise in relation 
to the other familiar and broadly used, yet differently interpreted term, sanction. On 
the  one  hand,  since  Hart  it has  become  the  prevailing  view  in  legal  theory  that 
sanction means privation, that is, a negative consequence. Even Yankah identifies 
sanctions  with breach of norms and, therefore,  with a negative consequence.20   On 
the other hand, sanction may be seen as rewards -ie Schauer refers to carrots and 
sticks.21     Sanctions,   however,   may   be  more  broadly   defined   as  any  type   of 
consequence that follows an act within the law whether that consequence  is positive 
or negative.22   There is an ambiguity in the claim that law is essentially coercive that 
needs to be untangled?3 Let us consider how this is evident when we compare Hart 
and Kelsen with the following two theses: 
 
A. According  to Kelsen  all legal norms have a sanction.  Legal norms that 
seem not to include  or make reference  to a sanction  are simply  incomplete 
and therefore are part of other sanction-imposing norms. From here, Hart 
somehow assumes Kelsen's and Austin's  views to be alike; that is to say, law 
is a group  of legal norms or commands  created by the sovereign  backed by 
threat. 
 
B. A milder version of thesis A may accept that some of the legal norms have 
a sanction. In other words, all legal systems include sanction-imposing  norms 
although not all legal norms have a sanction. 
 
The author defends a version ofthesis A. If we could demonstrate thesis A, thesis B 
would become irrelevant.  To do so, the notion of coercion or coercive  sanction in 
this paper includes  any legal consequence  that is to be applied  irrespective  of the 
will of the subject of the law. However, the issue is that since Hart most legal 
philosophers  assume  thesis  A has  been  refuted.  More  precisely,  in light of some 
passages  of Kelsen's  works  randomly  presented  by Hart, some  may  have doubts 
that this is a Kelsenian move. Contrary to this, the following paragraphs show that 
Hart was wrong in the way he interpreted Kelsen's  view. 
 
 
 
19  For a reference to the meaning of coercion  from Austin to Schauer, see Andrew 
Stumpff Morrison, 'Law  Is  the  Connnand of  the  Sovereign: H  L  A Hart 
Reconsidered' (2016) 29 Ratio Juris 364, 367 n 6. 
20 Yankah, above n 5, 1216-ff. 
21  Schauer, The Force of Law, above n 4, ch 8. 
22 Note that the author uses the term positive consequence  and not reward since reward 
may be an example of positive consequence  but not the only one. Some may even 
consider threats as offers. Indeed, the difficulty to distinguish threats and offers in 
cases of coercion was noted by Robert Nozick, 'Coercion' (1969) in Robert Nozick, 
Socratic   Puzzles   (1997) 15.  Nonetheless, these cases are the  exception. Legal 
sanctions include incentives to  comply with legal norms. My  gratitude to  the 
anonymous referees for their comments on this issue. 
23 My gratitude to the anonymous referees for their suggestions on this section. 
 
 
 
Hart - and thereafter  his followers  (for example very recently Green)24  - 
starts from a presupposition  based on an oversimplification  when he says that for 
Kelsen25   '[l]aw  is the primary norm which stipulated the sanction'. 26  In this regard, 
Hart somehow assumes that Kelsen identifies sanction with threat; rules therefore, 
according to this distorted  view, have the form of 'the antecedent  or "if clause" of 
conditional    orders   backed    by   threats    or   rules   imposing    duties'. 27     Hart's 
understanding  of Kelsen's  theory,  as manifested  in this quotation  is -to say the 
least -incomplete. His logic is flawed and his assessment plainly unfair. Let us see 
what Kelsen really said. 
 
Kelsen  tells  us that law, similar  to any other normative  system,  is a social 
order that regulates human behaviour.28  In order to distinguish the legal norms-ie 
rules for Hart - from  any other normative  system,  Kelsen tells  us that they  are 
hypothetical   statements.29    These   hypothetical   statements   - ought   statements 
linking antecedent and consequent-prescribe a coercive act, ie a sanction. 30 Thus, 
from a Kelsenian  perspective,  sanction  is the consequence  that ought  to follow  a 
given  antecedent  (understanding  the  antecedent  as  a  given  human  conduct).  In 
simple terms, if there is no human conduct there cannot be a sanction  (technically 
speaking).  If there  is human  conduct  and  the  law  prescribes  a consequence  that 
ought  to  follow  that  human  conduct,  then  a  sanction  arises  regardless  of  the 
consequence being positive or negative. 
 
As  with  any  other  normative  system  - ie  group  of  norms  that  regulate 
human social behaviou? 1 -law's function is to coordinate human conduct in inter- 
subjective  interference?2  Depending  on how these  behaviours  are dealt  with,  we 
may distinguish  various normative systems, law being amongst them.  Law, as any 
other  normative  system,  utilises  different  means  to  motivate  human  conduct  that 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Green, above n 15, 9. 
25   The author will refer only to Kelsen's view on sanction, coercion, and force. The 
bibliography that refers to Bentham and Austin in relation to this point, at least with 
what has to do with the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition, is already very 
rich. See John Austin, The  Province  of  Jurisprudence   Determined   (1832) 9-ff; 
Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (first published 1789, 1970 ed) 54; Hart, above 
n 3, 82-4. 
26 Hart, above n 3,  20-5.  Hans Kelsen, General   Theory  of  Law  and  State  (first 
published 1945, 2009 ed) 61. 
27 Hart, above n 3, 37. 
28 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (first published 1934, 2009 ed) 24. 
29 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 38. 
30 Ibid 45. 
31  Carlos E Alchourr6n and Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems (1971); Kelsen, Pure 
Theory of Law, above n 28, 15, 24; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above 
n26, 15. 
32  Carlos Cossio, La Teorfa Egol6gica del Derecho  y el Concepto Jurfdico de Libertad 
(first published 1944, 1964 ed). 
  
 
may be broadly classified into direct and indirect.33  In any case, for the purpose of 
this paper, whether a norm of given human conduct brings about advantages or 
disadvantages, such are going to be seen as sanctions. In other words, sanction 
means the consequence in any norm to a result of given human conduct regardless 
of that consequence being positive or negative. 
 
On this point, Schauer, although enlightening, does not escape the post- 
Hartian slippery slope as he too defines coercion interchangeably with sanction, 
associating the latter mainly with negative consequences.34 It is argued, at least for 
the purpose of this paper, that sanctions per se do not imply only negative 
consequences. In fact, they may also include positive ones even if we agree that 
sanctions in the form of negative consequences have a more visible role in social 
orders such as the legal order.35 
 
As a consequence, we may maintain that any normative system will count 
amongst its elements a sanction so defined. Moral, religious and legal systems 
regulate human behaviour in different manners. Despite their differences, all of 
them attach to human behaviour a sanction - ie a consequence - whether that 
consequence is positive or negative. For example: 
 
If you tell the truth, you will go to heaven. 
 
If you tell the truth, you will be an honourable man. 
If you tell the truth, you will not be prosecuted. 
Although all these norms have a certain sanction, there are still subtle differences 
amongst them. Whilst moral and religious norms have to do with the conduct or 
behaviour of one subject or individual, legal norms have to do with various subjects 
or individuals. Moral and religious norms of the kind do not lie or do not kill are 
limited to the behaviour or conduct of the subject or individual destined to. By 
contrast, legal norms are bilateral in the sense they refer to the behaviour or conduct 
of at least two subjects or individuals, and in a sense, these behaviours or conducts 
somehow interfere with each other. 
 
Ill.   Where the Confusion Starts: What Is Coercion? 
 
The  confusion  starts  when  coercion  and  sanction  are  inter-defined.36   Are  all 
sanctions coercive? It is maintained they are not. Are all coercive acts sanctions? It 
is maintained they are not. In this regard, sanction and coercion cannot define each 
other. Or, more specifically, sanctions and coercions are neither mutually exclusive 
nor  collectively  exhaustive.  In  other  words,  we  may  have  sanctions  without 
 
 
33  Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, above n 28, 24; Kelsen, General  Theory  of Law and 
State,  above n 26, 15. The author will further clarify  the point referred to as 
motivation and law in the next section of this paper. 
34 Schauer, The Force of Law, above n 4, 5. 
35  Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 17. 
36  See Schauer, The Force of Law, above n 4, ch 9, especially 127-ff. 
  
 
coercion and coercion without sanctions.  Furthermore, we may have sanctions that 
are  also  coercive.    Law,  as  we  will  see,  is  the  normative  system  that  has  the 
exclusivity of having sanctions that are coercive in a particular manner. 
 
Examples  of coercive  acts that  are not sanctions  are certain  administrative 
acts. They may happen independently of (even against) our will but they are not 
conditioned by human behaviour. Let us think of a natural catastrophe such as an 
earthquake.  If people are being  removed by local authorities  from their properties 
(even against their will) because of the danger of building collapse, we can maintain 
that they are being coerced - but not sanctioned - by the local authority.  More 
clearly, the consequence (coercive removal) does not follow from human behaviour 
(sanction)  but rather from non-human or natural facts.37  We must remind ourselves 
that, at least for the purpose of this paper, a sanction is the consequence  that ought 
to follow an antecedent, such antecedent being a given human conduct. 
 
Examples of sanctions that do not imply coercive acts come from normative 
systems other than law. Different from other normative systems, all legal norms, as 
we will see, are coercive norms in one way or another. As Kelsen rightly points out, 
coercion does not refer here to the internal  reasons why an individual may or may 
not act (or omit to act) in a certain  manner.  This may be assessed  by morality  or 
religion.  It  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  legal  norms  that,  by  contrast  with  other 
normative systems, they may be coercively  enforced?8 It follows from this that, in 
the case of an immoral act or one contrary to a religious norm, a process in the mind 
of the individual may follow, such as guilt or-at a supra-empirical level-divine 
retribution. Alternatively, a social process may be unleashed such as rejection of the 
actor  by other members  of the society.  Yet,  in none of these  cases will coercion 
have been deployed. Ergo, an immoral act or one against a religious norm will have 
a consequence  (sanction)  but will not necessarily bring about coercion (at least not 
coercion in the sense of positive law). 
 
Let us consider  murder through  the lens of law, morality,  and religion.  The 
law provides both sanction and coercion-ie a coercive sanction. For instance, if a 
person  commits  murder,  another  person  empowered  by  another  legal  norm  will 
apply a certain coercive sanction-eg prison. Morality however 'limits itself to the 
requirement:  though  shalt  not  kill' ?9   The  moral  norm  here  is  non-coercive  and 
depends for its efficacy only on voluntary obedience.  It may be said, however, that 
this  moral  norm  has  a  sanction.  If  the  murderer  is  ostracised  morally  by  his 
community  it  may  be  said  that  the  moral  consequence  - ie  sanction  - has 
 
 
37  For a more detailed account of coercive acts that are not sanctions see Kelsen, 
General  Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 278-9. For a discussion on whether 
there are social orders without sanctions see Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, above n 28, 
27. For a view on and criticism of Kelsen's account of sanctions and coercion see 
Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction  to the Theory of Legal 
System (2nd ed, 1980) 77-85, 185-6. 
38  Note that the author refers to the fact that legal norms may be coercively enforced. 
This point is dealt with in more detail in the following section of this paper. 
39  Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 20. 
  
 
followed  albeit not by virtue of the moral order. Furthermore,  we may even argue 
that  all  moral  norms  have  a  similar  sanction  - ie  consequence  - that  is,  the 
question of the preservation or loss of honour. In any of these cases, coercion is not 
part of the picture. 
 
And now the crucial question, what is coercion?40  Part of the confusion has to 
do with including non-legal elements when assessing this question.  In this way, by 
adding extraneous elements we obscure the picture rather than offer a more pristine 
view  of  what  the  law  is.  With  reference  to  coercion,  Kelsen  made  clear  the 
distinction  between the inner and outer considerations,  as the previous section has 
just introduced. He also made clear that only the outer, objective side of coercion is 
relevant to the law. In his words '[t]he  element of coercion is relevant only as part 
of the contents of the legal norm, only as an act stipulated  by this norm, not as a 
process in the mind ofthe individual subject to the norm'.41 The author follows this 
path too. For the purpose of this paper, coercion - or more specifically,  coercive 
sanction -arises when the consequence that follows given human conduct ought to 
be independent  of (even against) the subject's will - ie the word  independent is 
used rather than against  as the subject may, as we will see, be willing to align his 
volition with the consequence.42  In other words, the legal norm (in large, the legal 
system)   provides   specific  acts  as  consequences   that  ought  to  follow  specific 
antecedents in specific cases regardless of whether we want them or not.43 
 
Therefore,  in  this  paper,  coercion  means  - a  broad  account  of  coercion 
labelled  here  as  coercion  by  default  - that  somehow  the  choice  of  antecedent 
conduct is limited to the subject as only such antecedent will bring about the 
consequence   prescribed  by  the  legal  norm  and  the  consequence   that  ought  to 
happen.  The  circumstance   that  the  consequence   that  follows  the  antecedent   is 
positive or negative does not alter the fact that the given human conduct is limited 
and  ought  to  happen  even  against  the  subject's will.  Therefore,  in  relation  to  a 
coercive   sanction   that   is  negative   in  nature,   if  the   antecedent   happens,   the 
consequence  ought  to  follow  independently  of  (even  against)  the  process  in the 
mind of the individual subject to the norm. On the contrary, in relation to a coercive 
sanction that is positive in nature, the consequence ought to follow independently of 
the process  in the mind of the individual  subject to the norm if, and only if, the 
subject complies with the antecedent prescribed by the legal norm. For instance, the 
subject  either  a) follows  the  antecedent  and  therefore  the  consequence  ought  to 
follow  - eg  he  murders  and  ought  to  be  sentenced  to  a  penalty  or  he  signs  a 
contract  and  ought  to  have  consequent  rights  and  obligations;  or  b) he does  not 
 
40 For other views see Morrison, above n 19, 367 n 6. For an extensive analysis see 
William A Edmundson, 'Is Law Coercive?' (1995) 1 Legal  Theory  81. However, 
Edmundson recognises, taking Wertheimer's two-prong analysis, a  moralised 
account of coercion. 
41 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 30. 
42 Indeed, as Kelsen rightly points out, the subject may act or omit to act because of 
motives other than the reward or punishment. See Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, above 
n28, 26. 
43 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 29-30. 
  
 
follow the antecedent and the prescribed consequence does not follow -eg he does 
not murder hence he ought not to be sent to prison or he does not sign the contract 
and hence ought not to have consequent rights and obligations. 
 
In a well-known move in legal philosophy, Hart argues that there is more to 
law than 'orders backed by threat'. 44 Indeed, this is a correct statement. However, in 
light of the above considerations, it can be seen that coercion does not mean only 
threat - at least according to a Kelsenian account of coercion.  Therefore, Hart's 
criticism - at least with regard to Kelsen - is plainly unfair. The point may be 
developed further. Paraphrasing Hart the law may say do X regardless  of whether 
you wish or not to do it but may also say if you wish to do X, this is how you do it. 
The  classical  distinction  between  duty-imposing  and  power-conferring  norms 
applies  here.  Hart  made  clear  that  the  former  group  may  be  characterised  as 
coercive but the latter cannot. That is because - according to him - for all his 
predecessors  (including  Kelsen), coercion  implies threat.  This  observation, the 
author submits, is an oversimplification. 
 
It is obvious that 'legal rules defining the ways in which valid contracts or 
wills or marriages are made do not require persons to act in certain ways whether 
they wish to or not'. 45  Kelsen also acknowledges duty-imposing rules and power- 
conferring ones, even permissions.46 In all these cases, however, human conduct is 
subject to coercion. That is because, although law does not require persons to act in 
certain ways in all circumstances -eg with respect to contracts, wills, marriage - 
it does require persons to comply with a given antecedent if they wish a certain 
consequence to follow in law. In that sense, law limits human conduct-ie human 
conduct is being coerced - as, in order for a consequence to follow, the subject 
must comply with what the antecedent prescribes. The law is not simply suggesting 
or advising a subject that if he wishes to sell his house he may do so by signing a 
piece of paper called a contract. The law clearly states that if the subject aims to sell 
his house in such a manner that no third party may have any right whatsoever over 
the property, he ought to comply with certain conditions prescribed by the norms. In 
this way, the law is intervening in the subject's conduct by making clear what the 
antecedent is in order to achieve a given consequence binding in law. To that extent, 
the subject's conduct is also being coerced - ie the subject's choice is limited - 
by power-conferring norms. The consequence ought to follow (the contract will be 
legally binding) independently of the process in the mind of the individual subject 
to the norm if, and only if, the subject complies with the antecedent prescribed by 
the legal norm. 
 
As an interpretive matter, it may be questioned whether Kelsen's conception 
of sanction or coercive sanction is as wide as the author claims, ie that it covers any 
normative consequence -including positive consequences like rewards -that the 
law may connect to a certain state of affairs.47  Indeed, it is not difficult to find 
 
44 Hart, above n 3, 27. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 75-ff. 
47 My gratitude to the anonymous referees for their suggestions on this section. 
  
 
passages on Kelsen's  Pure Theory of Law that seem to be irreconcilable with such a 
view. Let me cite two: 
 
According to the Pure Theory, the consequence attached in the 
reconstructed legal norm to a certain condition is the coercive 
act  of  state  - comprising punishment   and    the   civil    or 
administrative use of coercion -whereby only the conditioning 
material fact is qualified as an unlawful act ...48 
 
What is socially desired is brought about or pursued by attaching 
a consequence to human behaviour that is the opposite of what is 
desired - the  consequence, namely, of  a  coercive act  (the 
coercive deprivation of something good, such as life, liberty, or 
property). The legal system is obviously taking as its point of 
departure the assumption that the human beings whose 
behaviour it governs consider this coercive act an evil to be 
avoided.49 
 
Someone may think this is rather explicit: the sanction is unambiguously 
described as essentially  negative in the second quote, and the first quote is equally 
hard to square  with the author's  approach:  behaviour  that is to  be rewarded  will 
hardly qualify as an unlawful act, which is the condition for the application of 
punishment.  But  taking  these  quotations  separately  from  the  Kelsenian  overall 
theory  is again  misinterpreting  what Kelsen says.  To be precise  with a Kelsenian 
account we have to make clear: 
 
1.  'Contrary   to   norm   is  a  completely   different   category   from   logical 
contradiction. '50 
 
2. Secondary  norms  for  Kelsen  are not  power-conferring  norms  (a type  of 
secondary   rules  for  Hart).   Secondary   norms  for  Kelsen  are  the  norms 
'establishing sanction-avoiding  behaviour ... '51 
 
Any legal norm  (primary  norm for  Kelsen)  may have a) a norm that is its 
opposite and/or b) a norm that is its contrary. From there, a) and b) are not the same 
if we understand  Kelsen correctly.  Let us consider: the following conditional  (1) if 
P performs A, then Sought to follow. In simple terms,  if A ought to be S where A is 
the illicit act and S the sanction.  For example,  if a murder ought to follow  prison. 
From there,  a logical  contradiction  (the opposite  norm) to A would be -A. In the 
example, for murder (or to kill) would be not to kill. This is a logical contradiction. 
However, hidden implicitly under the surface of this primary norm (Kelsenian 
terminology)  rests the  secondary  norm that  includes  the legal  obligation  or duty; 
 
 
48 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory  (1992) 26. 
49 Ibid 28-9. 
50  Ibid 30, especially 30 n 26. Expressions such as illegal, unconstitutional and others 
are different from logical contradiction. Technically, for this paper, opposite is the 
reverse of something (for A would be -A) and contrary means an opposing nature or 
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that is, the conduct that the law intends to support -ie the secondary norm. In this 
case, to respect  others'  life (contrary in nature or character to A). 
 
For Hart secondary rules are other rules that refer to primary ones, whether 
they are rules of change, adjudication, or recognition. When Kelsen refers to 
secondary norms, he refers to something different. Kelsen still refers to human 
conduct, the one that is the legal obligation or legal duty hidden implicitly in the 
primary norm. This way of thinking can be applied to duty conferring and power 
conferring rules. 
 
Consider the aforementioned conditional (1) if P performs  A, then  S ought  to 
follow.  This may be the logical form of, for example, criminal prohibitions and 
(ignoring the offer/threat issue) laws conferring tax bonuses or bounties on 
production. But power conferring rules seem to have the structure (2) if  C is  to 
follow,  then  P must  perform  A. While (some, many, even all?) instances of (2) may 
be bi-conditionals, that does not seem to be the case for (1). Hence these seem to be 
different structures. 
 
What seems to be going on in the neighborhood -some may claim -is that 
if P invokes a power conferring norm, some other duty imposing norm might be 
triggered-ie (3) If P performs  A, then if Q peiforms B the Sought to follow  where 
for example the conditional in the consequent corresponds to the fact that any B 
who trespasses on the land I have purchased will be ejected.  Indeed, this seems to 
be Hart's point and so it would affirm rather than collapse the distinction between 
the two categories.52 Again, this may be Hart's way of thinking but not Kelsen's. 
 
According to Kelsen the legal norms prescribe mainly legal duties, and by 
implication, prerogatives. Therein, a legal norm of the form If  A  ought  to  be  S 
(primary norm for Kelsen) takes into account two facts only, that of the antecedent 
act and that of the consequent coercive sanction. Additionally, this primary norm 
states the duty to sanction by the authority in charge of its application. Indeed, a 
legal norm is a conceptual construction: a concept whose object is free human 
conduct. Therein, that same conceptual construction points out amongst many 
possibilities which ones ought to be followed should we want to avoid a result (duty 
imposing norms) or aim to obtain a certain outcome (power conferring norms). 
 
In tum, the legal duty of the rest of the subjects or individuals, the duty to 
behave licitly is not expressly mentioned by the primary norm (for a Kelsenian 
account) but understood by inference - ie it is implicit in the meaning of the 
primary norm. This is for a Kelsenian account the secondary norm-ie the conduct 
or behaviour, the legal duty the legislator aims to support. In the simple example If 
a  murder,  ought  to be  prison  this is the primary norm; from there, the behaviour 
contrary to that norm is not  to  kill  others  and the legal duty is to  respect  others' 
lives. 
 
The same way of thinking, that is the Kelsenian account, can be applied to 
duty-imposing  rules  and  power-conferring ones.  In  all  cases,  we  have  in  law 
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coercive sanctions of a particular kind, as we will see. Similar to what we did with 
the example of murder and the if A ought to be S basic structure, we may do with 
contract law, the law of torts and any other. Let us consider the case of a loan: if a 
contract of loan it ought to be the devolution of the amount borrowed to the lender 
plus interest (if  C is to follow, then P must perform A where C is the loan, P is the 
lender and A is the act of lending money). If the lender does not lend the money, 
there is no loan contract. If the lender lends the money and the borrower receives 
the money, there is a loan contract. If the expectation is that the borrower pays back 
the money plus interest then there is a loan contract (if the expectation or duty is not 
to pay back it may me something else, for example, a donation, but not a loan 
contract). In that sense, both lender and borrower have their conduct coerced since 
they ought to behave in a certain way in order to establish a contract of loan. They 
ought  to  follow  what the  law  says.  The  law  is  not  simply  advising  them  or 
suggesting how to behave should they want to have reciprocal legal rights and 
duties. And all this is regardless of the fact the borrower may not pay back the 
money and interest owed and consequently, the lender may seek to enforce the 
payment legally (coercion sensu stricto as we will see). 
 
IV.   Even Angels Are Coerced 
 
So far we have seen that: 
 
Sanction Consequence of human act (or omission) 
prescribed by social norm 
Coercion Act/omission follows even against 
subject's will 
 
From the above we can infer that law is not the only social order that may use 
sanctions. Morality and religion as social orders exert a certain form of coercion 
too.53   The difference between law and any other social order is not whether they 
prohibit, permit, or  command  a given  act  or  omission.  They  are  different  not 
because of what they prohibit, permit, or command. The difference between law and 
any other social order relates to how they prohibit, permit, or command. In other 
words, law as a social order conditions certain antecedents to consequences that 
ought to  follow even against our will - ie coercive sanctions.54   Morality and 
religion may exert coercion too but of a different kind. We may even argue that our 
behaviour is limited by morality and religion, and that for a given antecedent -eg 
murder - a consequence ought to  follow - eg  rejection, hell; in this  sense, 
morality and religion may be characterised as coercive. However, this kind of 
coercion is only psychic coercion. 
 
Law may bring about psychic coercion too, but this characteristic does not 
define law.  The motivation may  be triggered  by  psychic impulse but it  is not 
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necessary to law.55 In other words, human conduct that complies with what the legal 
norm prescribes may happen by other motives, for instance moral and religious 
principles. However, this psychic coercion has nothing to do with the coercive act 
prescribed by the legal norm.56  Examples of such coercion would be, say, where 
someone commits a criminal offence and regrets his action to the extent that he 
wishes to go to prison and does not further view that punishment as a threat, or 
someone who commits a criminal offence in order to go to prison only because he is 
interested in having his meal served daily.57  Another example would be the case of 
a person getting married in order to be granted the same nationality as his spouse 
and therefore, to receive social benefits otherwise limited to nationals. All these 
sanctions are coercive from the perspective of the law because they ought to happen 
provided the respective antecedents also happen regardless of whether the subject 
wants them to happen or not. Whether the subjects in each situation choose to act or 
not to act in response to psychic coercion is a matter that goes beyond the law. 
Whether the subject considers the sanction a curse or a blessing has no relevance 
whatsoever to defining the legal norm. That the legal norm brings about coercive 
sanctions in the form of punishment or reward means that the legal order prescribes 
consequences that ought to follow certain antecedents independently of (even 
against) our will. Indeed, from a sociological and psychological point of view, we 
may argue whether psychic coercion is present - ie whether the subject acted or 
omitted to act due to moral, religious, or even practical reasons such as food and 
shelter -but that is irrelevant to the legal norm in the sense it does not define the 
law. 
 
To discard the coercive character of law, ingenious theoretical devices 
appeared in jurisprudence. It has been pointed out that, in a society of angels,58 
coercion is not needed and that the law (at least in theory) can therefore do without 
it. According to this view, it follows that, if we can demonstrate that theoretically 
law can do without coercion, then coercion is not conceptually necessary to define 
the law. The author does not concur in this view. This is because, even in this 
society of angels, the conduct of such angels will need to be regulated by a certain 
ethereal law; it thus follows that our angels will have their conduct interfered with 
by norms and will therefore have to comply with antecedents in order to incur the 
prescribed consequences that ought to follow. Both Schauef 9 and Yankah60  criticise 
Raz's  methodology,  but  only  on  the  surface.  They  take  the  view  that  legal 
philosophy should focus on law as it is in reality -as it is experienced -and not 
as it applies in theory. However, these criticisms do not revise Raz's approach or its 
application. They simply categorically discard the approach as a whole. In other 
words, in order to discard Raz's  methodology, Schauer and Yankah do not only 
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change the rules but also the game. It will, nonetheless,  be attempted to follow Raz 
and  show  that,  even  in theory,  law is inherently  coercive.61  Let us consider  this 
angelical case in more detail. 
 
Raz introduces us to a society of angels in which its members act (or omit to 
act) depending on what they think is right. However ideal this society is assumed to 
be, conflicts can be expected amongst the angels. Law is required to deal with such 
conflicts.  Because the members  of this society are angels, we are asked to assume 
that they will comply with the prescriptions of the law, and that therefore coercive 
sanctions  are not necessary.  It follows,  from this  perspective,  that a legal system 
without coercion is logically possible.62  The author disagrees. 
 
Faced  with the  challenge  of conjuring  up a hypothetical  celestial  scenario, 
two main problems arise. Firstly, we need to agree upon the profile of our society of 
angels -who these angels are, what their characteristics  are, and so on. Assuming 
we  follow  Raz,  these  angels  are  part  of  a  society  in  which  the  members  act 
according  to what they think  is right. The second  problem  is that these  angelical 
beings need to decide what type of act makes their claims right; they have to agree 
on what is right or, in the case of disagreement,  what counts as right in a particular 
situation.  Let us assume that one of the angels discovers  earth.  The first question 
that  will  arise  is  who  is  the  rightful  owner  of earth?  Undoubtedly,  a variety  of 
answers will follow including the following:  the first one setting foot on earth, the 
first  one to  have a permanent  settlement  by moving  from heaven  to earth,  or its 
original creator. Thus, in relation to the second problem, the angels must choose the 
theoretical background to decide what is just: res nullius or res communis -ie the 
originally  uninhabited  territory  belonging  to no-one  or everyone  having  a certain 
right over it. Assuming the angels agree on res nullius or res communis, one party 
may still claim that whoever was the first one on the territory is its rightful owner. 
However,  the opposite  party may dispute this,  supporting  its case with historical, 
legal, political, cultural and geographical  evidence, and arguing either a) that it was 
there  first,  or  b) that  being  first  is  not  what  makes  acquisition  just,  but,  rather 
exploitation  of the earth's  resources, or the establishment  of a community.  Indeed, 
angels  need  law.  It follows  from  this,  that  for the  sake  of avoiding  conflicts  or 
solving them when they arise, legal rules are required. If legal rules are required, 
angelical conduct will be somehow interfered with. If angelical conduct is interfered 
with, angelical  conduct  is not free from limitations.63  In other words,  if an angel 
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wants earth to be his own, he will have to follow what the law says in order to have 
rightful ownership. The consequence (earth's  rightful ownership) ought to follow 
independently of the process in the mind of the angel subject to the norm if, and 
only if, the angel complies with the antecedent prescribed by the legal norm. Hence, 
even in the case of a society of angels, legal norms require coercion. That does not 
mean, as we will see in the next section, that actual coercive enforcement will be 
necessary amongst angels. This is because, as angels, we assume they will follow 
what they think is right. Therefore, although two angels may not agree at first who 
earth's  rightful owner is, they both agree that they will do what is right. If the 
manner in which right is defined derives from the law, and the angels bring their 
dispute to the law, then they know that it is for the law to give them the answer on 
earth's ownership. 
 
Thus far, this paper has challenged Hart's arguably dogmatic view that 
coercion is not an element central to law. Certain different understandings have 
been disentangled and we have seen that sanctions may take the form of coercion 
but are not necessarily required to do so. However, when they do take this form, 
they are inextricably intertwined with law. Whether force is deployed or not is a 
different aspect in this enquiry. We will see in the next section of this paper that 
actual force  may be applied but this does not necessarily have to be done. For a 
narrow account coercion may be identified with the potential use of force in 
particular cases. Nevertheless, force does not need to be present in order to have 
coercion as it is a factual question as to whether power is actually used.64  Therefore, 
it is misleading to use the classical examples of rules of contract or wills in order to 
show that because they do not prescribe coercive sanctions they are not included in, 
for example, Kelsen's theory oflaw.65 It is correct to say that if we do not comply 
with the rules of contract, force  will not be used - this is a narrow account of 
coercion or coercion sensu  stricto.  However, to state that not complying with the 
rules for formation of contract will not have legal consequences is something 
different. That is because, even in cases such as the ones sub-examined, the subject 
has his conduct coerced, as if he does not comply with the rules of contract, there 
will be no contract and, therefore, no consequent rights and obligations. This is a 
broad  account  of  coercion  or  coercion  by  default.  In  this  regard, coercion  is 
generally or by default  part of the law. 
 
V. Coercion May Occasionally Not Be Part of the Law: 
Coercion Sensu Stricto 
 
There are several ways in which human behaviour may be motivated and coercion 
is just one of them. There are situations in which our conduct may be somehow 
limited with regard to what we ought to do or not to do - antecedent - in order 
for something else to happen - consequence. It is in these situations that our 
behaviour is coerced. More specifically, coercion may refer to the use of force but 
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need not necessarily do so. Indeed, it will be argued that there are other means to 
motivate  subjects  and the  use of coercion  will  be  rejected  in certain  cases.  It is 
intended to show that occasionally law may do without coercion. 
 
1. Motivation 
 
In the social, legal, political and moral spheres, an individual or subject offers four 
different levels of analysis:  a) in their individuality  (I); b) in their relationship with 
their peers (you and I); c) in their relationships  as part of a community  or society 
(us, from  an  internal  aspect);  d) as member  of a community  or  society  that  has 
relations  with  other  communities   or  societies  (us,  from  an  external  aspect).  A 
conflict of interest between subjects can happen only when more than one agent is 
involved.  Any community  or population  consists  of subjects  who are different  in 
many senses; pluralism, as Rawls ventures,66   is a permanent feature of society that 
cannot be ignored. Therefore, as in the case of the civil societies in Rawls' A Theory 
of  Justice,  it is assumed  that  subjects  in their  relations  recognise  some  rules  of 
conduct and act upon them.67   However, as in any circumstances  in which we have 
agents of different types, there will also be identity and conflict of interests.68 As a 
result,  criteria  are  needed  for  regulating  their  inter-subjective  interference.  Even 
Raz's  angels will need criteria too as we have seen in the previous section. 
 
Social orders such as religion, morality, and law exist in order to let subjects 
and   social   aggregations69    have  their   conduct   regulated   within   an   interactive 
framework  of  society.  As  Kelsen  says  such  orders  make  subjects  'refrain  from 
certain acts which, for some reason, are deemed  detrimental  to society, and to  ... 
perform others which, for some reason, are considered  useful to society'. 70  In this 
way, law, as with any other social order,  may motivate  subjects  to act or refrain 
from  acting  directly  or  indirectly.71   Law  'may  attach  certain  advantages  to  its 
observance  and  certain  disadvantages  to  its  non-observance'.72  Even  though  the 
former  'plays  a far more important  role'73  in social  reality, sanctions  do not only 
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There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes 
possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to 
live solely by his own efforts. There is conflict of interests since 
persons are  not  indifferent as  to  how  the  greater benefits 
produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to 
pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. 
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imply negative consequences  but may also include positive ones. In tune with this, 
Schauer attempts to include both advantages and disadvantages  in his account when 
maintaining  that 'there  can be rewards as well as punishments,  and law's  coercive 
. . .   power   often   includes   its   ability   to   create   positive   as   well   as  negative 
incentives'. 74   Unfortunately,  Schauer  falls  victim  to  oversimplification   too  as he 
defines  advantages  or  positive  consequences  in terms  of  rewards  only.75   Kelsen 
goes further and asserts that social orders may even function without advantages or 
disadvantages  and still  'require  conduct that appeals  directly  to the individuals' ?6 
Therefore,  legal rules may - according to a Kelsenian view - specify duties but 
also confer powers -therefore, all three fundamental  deontic concepts, obligation, 
prohibition, and permission are included.77 
 
In brief, normative orders exist to enable subjects to interact with each other 
within  social  aggregations   in  order  to  co-exist  in  harmony  with  each  other  as 
otherwise conflicts of interest may occur. These social orders -law being one such 
order-are the set of rules that help to promote inter-subjective  interaction within a 
framework  of  tolerance.   Such  orders  may  do  so  by  motivating  subjects  either 
directly  or indirectly.  Furthermore,  whether  this motivation  is direct or indirect, it 
may be in the form of negative but also positive consequences. 
 
2. Coercion and force 
 
Evidently, coercion is an example of a direct means to motivate behaviour-ie you 
ought to act or not to act in such a way in order for this or that consequence  to 
happen. However, coercion does not imply per se the use of force. This is another 
difference between the Hartian and Kelsenian accounts that is still present amongst 
us. Kelsen clearly states that '[t]his  does not mean that in carrying out the sanction 
physical force must be applied'.78 In tune with this, Schauer and Yankah's accounts 
of the inclusion of force as a way to characterise  coercion is rather hasty. Schauer 
maintains 
 
law's  brute force  ...  is  the principal identifying feature of 
legality has in  the past been conventional wisdom. . . .  But 
precisely the opposite - that force is not the characteristic or 
identifying feature of law -is now conventional wisdom ...79 
 
In  tum,   Yankah   tells  us  that   'Kelsen    . . .  conceived   of  law  as  simply 
proscribed norms the violation of which give rise to a corresponding sanction' 
understanding  'sanction  [as] a penalty attached to the breach of a norm ... '80  These 
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accounts  are  not  true;  or  at  least, they  are  not  an  accurate  description of  the 
Kelsenian view. 
 
Sanctions  are  coercive  measures  in  the  sense that  consequences happen 
independently  of-not necessarily against-the subject's will. Thus far, a broad 
account of coercion or coercion by default has been presented, as per the previous 
sections in this paper. Coercion- so defined- has two different facets: rational 
coercion, and, physical coercion.81  Legal norms, it is argued, are coercive in one 
sense but not necessarily in the other. More specifically, all legal norms apply 
rational pressure or bring about rational coercion but not all legal norms have the 
ability or need to deploy physical coercion. 
 
On the one hand, because a legal norm brings about rational coercion a given 
consequence ought to follow an antecedent, not as a process in the mind of the 
individual subject to  the  norm - that  is  for other normative systems such  as 
morality and  religion - but as an objectively prescribed consequence. This is 
common to all legal norms and in this sense all norms are coercive. Physical 
coercion, on the other hand, may follow a given antecedent but does not necessarily 
have to do so. After all, some coercive sanctions may, if and only if necessary,  be 
applied by the employment of physical force.82 For clarity, this last account will be 
named coercion sensu stricto. 
 
Thus  far,  all  normative  systems  follow  a  similar  structure  in  that  they 
prescribe a consequence to a given antecedent in order to regulate human conduct. 
When the consequence ought to follow as objectively prescribed by the norm, 
independently of - even against - the  process in the mind of the  individual 
subject to that norm, we have sanctions that are coercive. More specifically, these 
coercive sanctions are rationally coercive -ie the consequence ought to follow the 
antecedent regardless of the process in the mind of the subject. In addition to this, 
some coercive sanctions may be physically coercive too - ie in the event that the 
subject does not follow the consequence. Law has the exclusive prerogative in 
comparison with all other normative systems to force the subject. Let us be even 
more precise here. 
 
The use of force - ie physical coercion - is the exclusive prerogative of 
law as a social order.83   However, that  does not mean that the  use of force as 
exclusive to law defines it. In other words, force is instrumental to law as a form of 
coercion - ie physical coercion. However, that does not imply that coercion is 
defined only as force -ie force is but one of the modes coercion presents; or that 
force is the only form of coercion law has at its disposal. It only means that force, as 
a form of coercion, is exclusive to law. This is also an accurate reading of Kelsen's 
thesis.84 
 
 
81  Ibid 1226-ff. 
82  Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 19. 
83  Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, above n 28, 33-7. 
84  Kelsen, General  Theory  of Law and  State, above n 26, 18-21. For an example of 
post-Hartian misinterpretation of Kelsen's view see Green, above n 15, 7. Green 
  
 
Law may be defined as a set of legal rules or norms. These legal rules are 
statements  characterised   as  being  hypothetical  - ie  in  the  hypothetical  case  a 
certain antecedent  ought to have a respective consequence.  That consequence  may 
be either positive or negative. In the case of law as a social order, whether the 
consequence  is positive  or negative,  is, in all cases,  independent  of the subject's 
will. Coercion  sensu stricto may be used in the event 'resistance  is encountered  in 
applying  the  sanction'.85   In that  sense - and  that  sense  only - coercion  is an 
element that has to be considered in the quest to define what law is. Kelsen himself 
made it clear: 
 
If 'coercion' in the sense here defined is an essential element of 
law, the norms which form a legal order must be norms 
stipulating a coercive act, ie a sanction. In particular, the general 
norms must be norms in which a certain sanction is made upon 
certain conditions ...86 
 
However, that does not mean that actual force -ie a broad account of coercion - 
will  be  used.  Therefore,  law  may  occasionally  function  without  coercion  sensu 
stricto. 
 
VI.    Conclusion 
 
The force of law is, unquestionably,  one of the purported elements  of the law that 
legal  philosophy  will  continue  to  discuss  in the  years  to  come.  Whether  it is a 
necessary  or sufficient element, it is plain that it is an integral element of law and, 
therefore, should be included in any analysis ofthe nature oflaw. 
 
For  simplicity,  it is suggested  that  coercion  in  law  should  be  viewed  from  two 
different standpoints:  a) a narrow account of coercion or coercion sensu stricto; and 
b)  a  broad  account  of  coercion  or  coercion  by  default.  Following  a  Kelsenian 
approach,   the   rules   that   constitute   law   are   hypothetical   statements   relating 
antecedent  with consequent  regardless of the process in the mind of the subject - 
ie rational coercion. Specifically, the consequent is a sanction that may-but is not 
necessarily required to -incorporate the use of force -ie physical coercion. Ergo, a 
sanction is coercive as long as the consequence that ought to follow the antecedent is 
no longer dependant on the subject's will-ie a broad account of coercion. We are 
in the presence of coercion sensu stricto when the use of force may be required 
-ie a narrow account of coercion. This, however, does not mean that force has to 
be actually deployed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
groups together Bentham, Austin, and Kelsen and tells us that '[t]hey meant that law 
not only necessarily has such powers, but also that it necessarily uses them'. 
85  Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, above n 26, 18. 
86  Ibid 45. 
